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NOTES
modern business and commercial transactions, Louisiana should
make inducing breach of contract actionable under article 2315.
This tort can be introduced without equating this article to all
common law tort doctrines or impairing any civilian concepts.
In accord with the Civil Code's emphasis on performance, a
cause of action for inducing breach of contract will result in
greater security of contract in Louisiana.
Richard T. Simmons, Jr. and Pres Kabacoff
SALES-LESION BEYOND MOiETY-AcTIoN AGAINST
FIRST VENDEE AFTER RESALE TO THIRD PARTY
Plaintiff sold the timber on his property to defendant for
$12,800. Defendant resold the timber for $30,000 to a third party.
Plaintiff then filed suit against defendant for rescission of the sale,
subsequently amending his petition to include the third party
purchaser as a defendant. On a motion for summary judgment,
the suit against the third party purchaser was dismissed. The first
vendee and remaining defendant filed an exception urging no
cause of action which was primarily based on the ground that
since the ownership of the timber had passed into the hands of a
third party, the plea of lesion was no longer available to the ven-
dor. The district court sustained the exception and the court of
appeal affirmed.' The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the
judgment of the court of appeal, overruled the exception of no
cause of action, and remanded the case to the district court for
a trial on the merits. The court concluded that where immovable
property is sold for a lesionary consideration and the purchaser
subsequently resells the property, the original seller can recover
from the original purchaser the proceeds from the original pur-
chaser's sale to the third party. Or, in other words, the first ven-
dor can recover the difference between the price at which he sold
and the price which the vendee received when he subsequently
resold. O'Brien v. LeGette, 254 La. 252, 223 So.2d 165 (1969).
The Louisiana Civil Code defines lesion as "the injury suffered
by one who does not receive a full equivalent for what he gives in
a commutative contract. '2 It further specifies that when a vendor
of an immovable has received less than one-half the value of the
estate sold by him, lesion beyond moiety has occurred and the
1. O'Brien v. LeGette, 211 So.2d 427 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
2. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1860.
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vendor has the right to demand the rescission of the sale.8 It is
important to note, however, that the action of lesion beyond
moiety can only be asserted by a vendor,4 and is only granted
against sales or exchanges of immovables, and in some cases
partitions.5
The purchaser against whom lesion beyond moiety has been
alleged and proved has the choice of either returning the prop-
erty or paying the supplement of the just price, thereby keeping
the property. If the purchaser elects to pay the supplement of
the just price, it is of course necessary to determine what "the
just price" is. Civil Code article 2590 indicates that the just
price is that true value which the immovable had at the time of
the sale. The standards to use in determining this value, how-
ever, have apparently been a source of confusion and inconsis-
tency for our courts. Since this subject is not within the scope
of this Note, suffice it to say that Louisiana courts are divided
between the following two standards in determining the value
of the immovable for purposes of ascertaining the just price:
the "highest and best use" rule as used in expropriation cases,T
or the "actual use" rule which is indicative of the value of the
land as it was actually being used at the time of the sale.8
Where the purchaser still has possession of the property, the
Civil Code very clearly provides him with the option either of
paying the supplement of the just price or returning the immov-
able. However, it is necessary to determine which provisions
of the Civil Code provide for the case where the purchaser no
longer has possession of the property which he bought for a
lesionary price. There are actually four instances in which the
purchaser would no longer have possession of the property, or at
least possession of all of it. These instances occur when the fol-
lowing events take place:
3. Id. art. 2589. See also id. art. 2590.
4. Id. art. 2593.
5. See id. arts. 1862, 2594 (sales); arts. 2664-2667 (exchanges); art. 1861(1)
(partitions).
6. Id. art. 2591 "If it should appear that the immovable estate has been
sold for less than one-half its just value, the purchaser may either restore
the thing and take back the price which he has paid, or make up the just
price and keep the thing."
7. Fletcher v. Smith, 216 So.2d 663 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Martin v.
Mays, 127 So.2d 77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
8. Armwood v. Kennedy, 231 La. 102, 90 So.2d 793 (1956); Foos v. Creag-
han, 226 La. 619, 76 So.2d 907 (1954); Crow v. Monsell, 200 So.2d 700 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1967); Weber v. Coppola, 176 So.2d 154 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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(a) The immovable is partially destroyed by a force of na-
ture while in the hands of the purchaser. For example, using
the same immovable which was the subject of the noted case, if
only half of the timber A sold to B for a lesionary price were
destroyed by fire.
(b) The immovable is completely destroyed by a force of
nature. For example, A sells to B the timber on his land for a
lesionary price. One year later, and before the action in lesion
is brought, the whole stand of timber is totally destroyed by fire.
(c) The immovable partially ceases to exist in the posses-
sion of the purchaser because of a partial legal alienation. As an
example, B, the first purchaser for a lesionary price sells only
one-half of the timber he acquired from A to a third party.
(d) The immovable completely ceases to exist in the posses-
sion of the purchaser because the immovable has been legally
alienated. For example, B sells the timber which he acquired from
A to a third party. This is exactly the situation in the noted
case and will be discussed below.
In each of these cases it is important to note that B, the pur-
chaser of the timber from A for a lesionary consideration, ob-
viously cannot return the property to A when A brings the ac-
tion in lesion. The immovable has ceased to exist in the hands
of the purchaser, and therefore the two choices provided in Civil
Code article 2591, that is either to return the property or to pay
the supplement of the just price, are no longer available. It has
been elsewhere contended that, in this case, since the purchaser
no longer can return the immovable, he must therefore comply
with the one choice remaining, that is, to pay the supplement of
the just price.9 Such reasoning seems faulty in light of the un-
derlying theory of the action in lesion, and of a reference to the
sources of our Civil Code articles on the subject. Article 2591
actually seems to impose only one legal obligation upon the pur-
chaser of an immovable for a lesionary consideration. This ob-
ligation is to restore the immovable. Paying the supplement of
the just price is not an alternative legal obligation which the
vendor may enforce when it is impossible for the vendee to re-
turn the immovable. Paying this supplement is only a gratuity
which the law provides to the vendee, should the vendee elect
9. Note, 43 TUL. L. Rev. 435 (1969).
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not to restore the immovable, when in fact it is possible for him
to do so.
The principle that the purchaser of an immovable for a le-
sionary price actually owes only one legal obligation to his ven-
dor-restoration of the immovable-rests upon an authoritative
foundation when one considers the sources of Civil Code article
2591. The correlative article of the Civil Code of 1808 is article
111. The now well-known de la Vergne digest contains the
articles of the 1808 Civil Code with the source notes for each of
these articles as written by L. Moreau Lislet, one of the authors
of the Civil Code of 1808.10 Moreau Lislet cites a provision of
Las Siete Partidas" and also the French legal writer Pothier, in
his Contrat de Vente,' 2 as two of his sources for article 111 of the
Code of 1808, now Civil Code article 2591.
Pothier was very explicit in his contention that the buyer
only has the one legal obligation of restoring the immovable. 13
He wrote that the action which the law gives the seller is a re-
scissory action. When the seller brings the action in lesion, he
is bringing a rescissory action in which he is demanding that he
be placed in the same situation that he was in before he sold the
immovable for a lesionary price.14 It follows, therefore, that he
is demanding a restoration of the immovable whereupon he would
refund the lesionary price paid to him by the purchaser. He is
not demanding either a restoration of the immovable or a paying
of the supplement of the just price, because this is not the pur-
pose or function of a rescissory action. Pothier, in expanding
upon this principle, further submitted:
"The question has been discussed, whether there is
ground for this action, when the thing sold ceases entirely
to exist . . . [At this point Pothier reveals that some writers
10. See Pascal, A Recent Discovery: A Copy of the "'Digest of the Civil
Laws" of 1808 with marginal source references in Moreau Lislet's Hand, 26
LA. L. REV. 25 (1966); Pascal, Book Review, 30 LA. L. REV. 746 (1970).
11. LAS SIET PARTIDAS bk. 5, tit. 5, L. 56 (Moreau Lislet & Carleton transl.
1820).
12. POTHiER, TRAIT DU CONTRAT D0 VENTE no 331, 333 (1806).
13. POTHIER, CONTRACT OF SALE nos 332, 334 (Cushing transl. 1839). Actually
numbers 332 and 334 are translations of numbers 331 and 333 respectively
from the original French in Pothier's Contrat de Vente.14. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2589: "If the vendor has been aggrieved for
more than half the value of an immovable estate by him sold, he has the
right to demand the rescission of the sale, even in case he had expressly
abandoned the right of claiming such rescission, and declared that he gave
to the purchaser the surplus of the thing's value."
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contend that there is an alternative obligation imposed on
the buyer. If the buyer cannot return the immovable, he
must pay the supplement of the just price.]
"The principle, which serves for the foundation of the
opinion entertained by these doctors, seems to me to be false.
The obligation of the buyer is only of a single thing, namely,
a restitution of the estate; he is not in any manner the debtor
of the supplement of the just price, being obliged only to
the price, which his contract imports, and to nothing more.
The choice, which the law gives him to make up the just
price, is only a power granted him, to redeem himself from
the obligation to restore the estate, by the payment of the
supplement."15
The provision in Las Siete Partidas would seem to announce
the same principle. It provides that if the buyer is unwilling to
pay the supplement of the just price, then he must restore the
property.16 If the buyer actually has possession of the immovable
and refuses either to pay the supplement of the just price or to
restore the immovable, the law, in accordance with the nature
of a rescissory action, can only compel him to restore the im-
movable. It may not, in the alternative, compel him to pay the
supplement of the just price. Again, this is because the buyer is
under only the one legal obligation of restoring the immovable,
stemming from the nature of the rescissory action of which the
action in lesion is an example.
It is pleasing to note that this principle has at least one pre-
cedent in Louisiana jurisprudence. In the early case of Copley
v. Flint & Cox,17 the court incorporated with approval a part of
that portion of Pothier's writings previously quoted. Applying
this principle to the four situations in which the immovable has
either totally or partially ceased to exist in the possession of the
purchaser, the results, as contemplated by the underlying theory
of the lesion articles, logically follow.
In the first example given earlier, since the purchaser only
has the legal obligation of restoring the immovable, and since
it is obviously impossible for him to do so since the immovable
15. POTHIER, CONTRACT OF SALE no 349 (Cushing transl. 1839). Actually this
reference is to number 348 in the original French.
16. LAS SIETU PARTiDAS bk. 5, tit. 5, L. 56 (Moreau Lislet & Carleton transl.
1820).
17. Copley v. Flint & Cox, 16 La. 380 (1840).
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has ceased to exist, it follows that the seller has no cause of ac-
tion against the buyer. One at first blush might question the
equities of such a rule as applied to this situation. However, as
Pothier stated, the seller actually should congratulate himself
because if he had not made the sale, it would have been he who
would have lost the immovable, and consequently he would not
have had the price which he received.'8
The second situation is clearly provided for by Civil Code
article 2597, an article in perfect harmony with the principle
that the buyer only owes the legal obligation of restoration of
the immovable and not an alternative obligation of paying the
supplement of the just price. 19 The article provides that the seller
must resume possession of the thing in its state at the time of
the demand. The buyer is not bound for an injury sustained
through his fault or otherwise before the demand is made. There-
fore, in the example given above, the purchaser would only be
obligated to return the possession of the timber that was remain-
ing. As clearly indicated by the article, there can be no demand
for a supplement of the just price for that timber which has
burned. On the contrary, there can only be a demand for the
possession of the timber as it stands.
In the third example, it is true that the seller must resume
possession of the immovable in the state in which it is at the
time of the demand. However, the article further provides that
the purchaser is bound to make a reimbursement for the injuries
that he has turned to his own profit.2 0 Therefore, since the pur-
18. POTHIER, CONTRACT OF SALE no 349 (Cushing transl. 1839). Actually this
reference is to number 348 in the original French.
19. LA. CIV. CODE Art. 2597: "The seller who demands the rescission on ac-
count of lesion beyond moiety, must resume the possession of the thing, in
the state in which it is.
"The buyer, in this case, is not bound for the injury sustained through
his fault before the demand. He is only bound to make reimbursement for
such injuries as he has turned to his own profit."
20. It is interesting to note that there is no Code Napoleon or Louisiana
Civil Code of 1808 counterpart to Civil Code article 2597 (1870). What is now
our Civil Code article 2597 was added in the Civil Code of 1825. Unfortunately
the Projet of the Civil Code of 1825 lists no sources for the present article
2597. However, due to the surprising similarity between Civil Code article
2597 and a portion of Pothier's Contrat de Vente, it is very possible that
Pothier's writings were a major source for this article. Pothier wrote: "In
regard to degradations of the estate, there is no doubt, that the buyer, against
whom the rescissory action is prosecuted, ought to account for those of which
he makes a profit. For example, if he cuts down a wood of large trees ...
which he sells, or if he takes down a house and sells the materials, there is no
doubt, that he ought to account for the proceeds of such sales. As to de-
gradations, from which he derives no benefit ... he Is not liable to account,
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chaser has degraded the value of the whole estate of the timber
by selling one-half of it, and since this injury or degradation was
turned to his own profit, he must reimburse the seller by giving
him the gains realized on such a resale. And, of course, the seller
must resume only half of the estate of timber because it is im-
possible for the purchaser to return the other half. This is not
to say, however, that the buyer is being compelled to pay the
supplement of the just price for that portion of the timber which
he resold. On the contrary, the standard by which to measure
what the purchaser must reimburse is the profit which he made
when he resold the timber.
The fourth example tracks the events of the noted case. But
before discussing what sort of action the vendor has against the
purchaser in this situation, it should be noted that Louisiana
courts have consistently held that the action in lesion does not
lie against the third party purchaser in good faith.21 The theo-
retical basis for such a position is that the redactors of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code deleted that portion of the Code Napoleon
which allowed the action against third party purchasers.2 2 The
fact that the Louisiana courts seem to allow the action against
a third party purchaser in bad faith is, however, of little signifi-
cance. It appears that the courts have never allowed the action
provided he is the possessor in good faith; for he may neglect an estate,
which he believes to be his own, and which he does not know is subject to
restitution." POTHIER, CONTRACT OF SALE no 361 (Cushing transl. 1839). Actually
the reference is number 360 in the original French.
In the above quotation Pothier was considering the situation where al-
though the immovable had been degraded in value, still the immovable had
enough value to be the subject of a rescissory action whereby the purchaser
could be compelled to return the immovable in the state In which it was at
the time of the demand.
Perhaps the argument that a source of Civil Code article 2597 is found
in Pothier's Contrat de Vente is further strengthened when one considers the
original French in which the forerunner of article 2597 was written. That
article used the French word degradations (see 1 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES
314 (1937)), which has been translated into English as "injuries," which word
can be found in the present article 2597. At any rate, Pothier also uses, in
the original French, the word "degradations." POTmIER, TRAITU DU CONTRAT DE
VENTE no 360 (1806) reads in part: "A l'gard des ddgradations de l'heritage,
il n'est pas douteux que V'acheteur contre qui on exerce action rescisoire de
celle dont U, a profitd .... 1
Perhaps the similar wording in the original French between Pothier and
the forerunner of article 2597 is a doubtful ground upon which to partially
base an argument that the source of article 2597 is in Pothier's Contrat de
Vente. However, this wording, coupled with the striking conceptual simi-
larities as demonstrated above, would seem to lend at least some credence
to the view that the source of Article 2597 is in Pothier's writings.
21. See Morgan v. OBannon & Julien, 125 La. 367, 51 So.2d 293 (1910);
Snoddy v. Brashear, 13 La. 469 (1858).
22. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1681, par. 2 (Wright's transl. 1908).
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against a third party purchaser, even when that purchaser had
thorough knowledge of the inadequacy of price in the lesionary
sale to the first purchaser.2 3
Applying article 2597, the court in O'Brien concluded that
the purchaser had worked an injury to the estate by reselling
the estate, and that therefore he was bound to reimburse his
vendor. The reimbursement was to consist of the profit which
the purchaser derived from the resale.
The application of article 2597 in such a situation appears
faulty. The court was correct in not contending that since the
purchaser no longer has possession of the immovable, he must
now pay the just price. The purchaser owes only one legal ob-
ligation-the restoration of the immovable. (Of course as inti-
mated earlier, this principle is qualified to the extent that when
article 2597 is theoretically applicable, then the purchaser may
additionally owe the obligation of restoring the profits when the
injury results in profits.) The general rule, as previously indi-
cated, is that in a rescissory action the plaintiff is actually de-
manding that he be put back in the position that he was in before
the sale. Therefore, in general, there can be no action in lesion
to demand a rescission of the sale when the object of that de-
mand has totally ceased to exist.24 A close reading of article 2597
will indicate that this article is actually contemplative of the
case in which the purchaser is actually able to return the im-
movable, injured though it may be.
It would therefore appear that for whatever the reason,
when the immovable ceases to exist in the possession of the
purchaser, there is no longer any action in lesion, and therefore
no longer a demand for rescission available to the vendor. Yet
Pothier provides as an exception to this general rule the case in
which the immovable is totally resold. In a portion of Pothier's
Contrat de Vente specifically cited by Moreau Lislet as a source
for the now Civil Code article 2591, Pothier contends that although
the vendor of a lesionary sale actually passes ownership of the
property to the purchaser, the effect of thereafter bringing the
action in lesion is to rescind the contract and the alienation of
23. Morgan v. O'Bannon & Julien, 125 La. 367, 51 So. 293 (1910).
24. This was the situation given in the first example of this paper. Since
the timber estate was totally destroyed, the purchaser, who only has the
one legal obligation of restoring the immovable, no longer has an obligation
which can be enforced by the vendor.
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property made in consequence of it. Therefore the seller is, by a
fiction of law, considered as having always remained the proprie-
tor of the estate sold,25 and is entitled to the profits on resale.
Pothier further states that the buyer in such a case "puts himself
in the situation of one who sells the property of another, who is
not allowed to profit and enrich himself by the price for which he
sells."26
It is clear that the result reached by the court in the noted
case is the same as that suggested by Pothier. The difference
lies in the respective foundations for that same result. Article
2597, used by the court in O'Brien, contemplates the case where
there is actually a part of the immovable which can be returned.
Where the immovable has been totally resold, article 2597 is
not, therefore, theoretically applicable. However, by following
Pothier's approach, one sees that the same equitable result is
reached.
In conclusion, one can state the following rules:
(a) When the immovable has totally ceased to exist because
of a force majeure or by some method other than by legal alien-
ation, the vendor no longer has an action in lesion against the
purchaser. Actually the equities are in favor of such a rule be-
cause had the vendor not sold at all, the immovable would likely
have been destroyed while in his possession. He would not even
have received the price which he did, inadequate though that
price might have been.
(b) When the immovable has partially ceased to exist either
by a force of nature or by legal alienation, the vendor must re-
sume possession of the immovable in its present state, subject to
the vendor's right to demand reimbursement for any profits which
the purchaser might have derived through causing the injury to
the estate. In such a case, article 2597 is clearly applicable.
(c) When the immovable has been totally resold, the pur-
chaser must account for all the profits made by the resale. It is
submitted that this last rule, the one which is applicable to the
noted case, is not only a rule which is theoretically correct, but
also an equitable one. If a good faith purchaser were made to
25. POTHIER, CONTRACT OF SALE no 332 (Cushing transl. 1839). Actually the
reference is to number 331 in the original French.
26. POTHIER, CONTRACT OF SALE no 359 (Cushing transl. 1839). Actually the
reference is to number 349 in the original French.
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pay back the supplement of the just price, this might often be
greater than any profit he might have received on resale.27 For
example, A sells to B an immovable for $4,000. B sells to a third
party for $7,000. The just price of the the immovable is $10,000.
If B were compelled to pay A the supplement of the just price,
he would have to pay $6,000. Yet, by following the approach
outlined above and used in O'Brien, if B only had to account for
the profits, he would pay A $3,000.
Therefore, it is submitted that the result reached by the
court is a just one. There is no reason, either on theoretical or
equitable grounds, for holding a purchaser who has not prac-
ticed violence or fraud to the stringent requirement of paying
the supplement of the just price when he cannot, in fact, return
the immovable. The vendor is still protected in that he can de-
mand the profits whenever the purchaser resells.
David Levingston
TERMINATION OF A DEcLARED UNIT
In current practice voluntary units for drilling for and pro-
ducing oil and gas fall into either of two categories: "contractual"
or "declared." "Contractual" units are formed by an agreement
among all the parties who have an interest in the unit (lessors and
lessees).1 "Declared" units result from exercise by a mineral
lessee of a pooling power, usually granted in the lease, and are
normally effectuated by filing of a pooling declaration in the
public records. Once a voluntary unit has been formed, there
is uncertainty as to what events or occurrences will terminate
the unit. It is within the power of contracting parties to pro-
vide expressly for conditions which will resolve any type of
voluntary unit or vary the basis upon which production or costs
are to be shared. For example, the unit agreement may contain
a provision either limiting its duration to a fixed number of years
or perpetuating it until a commissioner's unit might be formed
or unit production might cease.2 Also, the parties may simply
27. See Justice Summers' dissent in O'Brien v. LeGette, 254 La. 252, 260,
223 So.2d 165, 169 (1969).
1. Note, 24 LA. L. REV. 935, 937 (1964). See Texaco, Inc. v. Vermilion
Parish School Bd., 145 So.2d 383, 394 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) (concurring
opinion); Comment, 10 LOYOLA L. REV. 224 (1960).
2. See 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW-POOLING AND UNITI-
ZATION § 931 (1964).
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